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NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF GENDER
TRANSGRESSION: THE ETHICS OF GENDER
IDENTITY DISORDER AS CRIMINAL
DEFENSE AND THE CASE OF
PFC. CHELSEA MANNING
Madeline Porta †
A young person sits in a dark room, face lit by the glow of a com-
puter screen. The person types for long stretches, then pauses while wait-
ing for an instant message response from a new “friend.” The message
thread is bursting with the types of confessions familiar in a world of
cyber anonymity: job frustration, anxiety, interspersed with flirtatious
chatter and inquiries. The scene could describe the activities of hundreds
of thousands of young people in America on any given night. When we
learn the young person is gay and cannot tell anyone about it, or that the
online pseudonym used differed from the gender assigned to the person at
birth, we can still picture the scene. We know plenty of young people this
could be, maybe even ourselves.
Except this young person, Chelsea Manning,1 formerly and fa-
† J.D. 2013, City University of New York School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge
the assistance and guidance provided by Ruthann Robson, Professor of Law and Uni-
versity Distinguished Professor. Without her insights, encouragement, and example
this piece would not have come to be. I also thank Professor Steve Zeidman, Director
of CUNY Law’s Criminal Defense Clinic, for his feedback, ideas, and passion for en-
suring zealous defense for all. I am also profoundly grateful for the thoughtful edits
and comments—and general love and support—from my fellow CUNY students as we
grapple with these issues, especially Wade Rosenthal, Milo Primeaux, Alexandra
Smith, Sabina Khan, and the ever-patient editors of this piece, Missy Risser, Cristian
Farias, Tatenda Musewe, Ariana Marmora, Chris Michael, and Javeria Hashmi. Finally,
my deepest appreciation goes to Tanisha Thompson for her love, light, and laughter.
1 A day after being sentenced for various military offenses, Manning announced
in a written statement that he would like to be known as Chelsea Manning, requested
the use of feminine pronouns, and expressed a desire to undergo hormone therapy
“as soon as possible.” See TODAY: Bradley Manning: I Want to Live as a Woman (NBC
television broadcast Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://www.today.com/news/bradley-
manning-i-want-live-woman-6C10974915. Various media outlets quickly honored Man-
ning’s request and began using the correct pronoun. See Andrew Beaujon, AP, New
York Times, NPR Update Style on Chelsea Manning, POYNTER (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www
.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/222260/ap-new-york-times-update-style-on-chel
sea-manning/. Except for direct quotations or attributions where a different pronoun
would make reading cumbersome, this Note will also use the correct pronouns
throughout, even when referencing events and circumstances occurring before Man-
ning’s announcement. See cf. Adam Klasfeld, Transgenderism More Likely in the Military,
Study Finds, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (July 24, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://www
.courthousenews.com/2012/07/24/48664.htm (“Manning reportedly told his lawyers
and the public to refer to him as a male.”); Evan Hansen, Manning-Lamo Chat Logs
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mously known as Pfc. Bradley Manning, was instant-messaging from a
tiny office in Iraq where she was deployed as an Army private. And the
anxieties expressed had to do not only with being gay in a “Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell”2 (DADT) environment of forced secrecy, but also (and more
importantly) about being a whistleblower against the U.S. government.
The job complaints were about the hours spent as an intelligence analyst
viewing computer files which exposed atrocities the government was hid-
ing from the media (and the public), including the indiscriminate mur-
der of Iraqi civilians and journalists by U.S. troops shooting from an
Apache helicopter. Manning did not want to keep these secrets. And she
didn’t. Manning was distraught about her complicity in covering up
evidence of war crimes, and also about what would happen to her if she
refused to continue to hide that evidence. And if caught, the fear loomed
that her image would go out to the world: “[I] wouldn’t mind going to
prison for the rest of my life, or being executed so much, if it wasn’t for
the possibility of having pictures of me . . . plastered all over the world
press . . . as [a] boy . . . .”3
Revealed, WIRED (July 13, 2011, 3:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/
07/manning-lamo-logs/ (noting that Manning chose to use the name “Breanna Man-
ning” when setting up Twitter and YouTube accounts). For commentary on pronoun
usage specific to Manning, see Rainey Reitman, Feminist, Transgender Advocates Should
Support Bradley Manning, WASHINGTON BLADE (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.wash-
ingtonblade.com/2012/02/23/feminist-trans-advocates-should-support-bradley-man
ning/; Emily Manuel, Why Does the Media Still Refer to “Bradley” Manning? The Curious
Silence Around a Transgender Hero, GLOBAL COMMENT (Dec. 22, 2011, 2:57 AM), http://
globalcomment.com/2011/why-does-the-media-still-refer-to-%E2%80%9Cbradley%E
2%80%9D-manning-the-curious-silence-around-a-transgender-hero/; Julie Swoope,
Private Manning and Being Outed as Transgender, THE TRANS LIFE (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://thetranslife.com/?p=498; Archive of Tumblr Posts Tagged with “Breanna Man-
ning,” TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/breanna%20manning (last visited
Sept. 25, 2013); Jos, Why Do the Media and Her Supposed Supporters Continue to Misgender
Breanna Manning?, FEMINISTING (Dec. 22, 2011), http://feministing.com/2011/12/
22/why-does-the-media-and-her-supposed-supporters-continue-to-misgender-breanna-
manning/. For commentary on the problems of English-language pronouns for trans-
gender communities, see The Need for a Gender-Neutral Pronoun, GENDER NEUTRAL PRO-
NOUN BLOG (Jan. 24, 2010), http://genderneutralpronoun.wordpress.com/.
2 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654, prevented lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people from disclosing their sexual orientation in the military. President Ba-
rack Obama implemented the repeal of the law on September 20, 2011. See FREEDOM
TO SERVE: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO LGBT MILITARY SERVICE, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL
DEFENSE NETWORK 2 (2011), http://sldn.3cdn.net/5d4dd958a62981cff8_v5m6bw1gx
.pdf.
3 Hansen, supra note 1 (quoting Manning in the chat logs with Adrian Lamo as
saying, “i just. . . dont wish to be a part of it. . . at least not now. . . im not ready. . . i’ve
totally lost my mind. . . i make no sense. . . the CPU is not made for this motherboard.
. . .”).
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INTRODUCTION
Manning was arrested soon after her chat “friend” Adrian
Lamo4 told the federal government about the chats—namely, that
4 Lamo is a computer hacker who was arrested in 2003 for breaking into the com-
puter networks of the New York Times, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and MCI WorldCom. He
took a plea from federal prosecutors and received six months of house arrest and two
years of probation. See Kevin Poulsen, Feds Say Lamo Inspired Other Hackers, SECURITY
FOCUS (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9520.
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Manning was in contact with Julian Assange and was considering
turning over the evidence of war crimes and other select files to
WikiLeaks.5 Manning’s subsequent detention and court-martial6
have been watched and criticized for many reasons. This Note will
concentrate on one specific aspect of the case: the earliest defense
strategy of eliciting Manning’s gender identity, including the use of
the diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and negative ste-
reotypes associated with it, as a factor mitigating Manning’s culpa-
bility.7 It will examine disparities between what is good for social
justice movements versus what is good for individual people ac-
cused of crimes, applying criminal defense ethical theories and
comparing Manning’s case to criminal cases in which negative ste-
reotypes about marginalized groups have been used to benefit indi-
vidual persons accused of crimes. While the issues raised by
Manning’s defense are applicable in the context of the criminal
system, Manning is not being tried within that system, nor is her
case indicative of trends within it.8
5 See GREG MITCHELL & KEVIN GOSZTOLA, TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES: THE U.S. VS.
BRADLEY MANNING 130–31 (2012) (noting that Manning contacted Lamo for the first
time on May 20, 2010; that they began instant-messaging each other on AOL that day;
and that on May 21, Lamo informed his friend and former Army counterintelligence
agent about the chats but he continued chatting with Manning until May 26). See also
Hansen, supra note 1.
6 Courts-martial are trials for military offenses, governed by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). The rules governing courts-martial are contained in the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial. See JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2012), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm
.pdf. Military courts are administrative bodies governed by Article I of the U.S. Consti-
tution and are thus not subject to the same procedural requirements as Article III
courts. See ESTELA I. VELEZ POLLACK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21850, MILITARY
COURTS-MARTIAL: AN OVERVIEW 1–3 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/
RS21850.pdf.
7 The tactic is controversial and objectionable on many levels that I will discuss in
this Note, which in turn is my attempt—as a white, queer, cisgender (person who is
not transgender and whose gender identity conforms generically to the biological sex
assigned at birth) activist, trans ally, and aspiring criminal defense attorney—to grap-
ple with the tensions between criminal defense lawyering and social justice
movements.
8 As a low-income, white, apparently gender-conforming gay person in the Army,
Manning is not entirely representative of those whom the criminal system systemati-
cally seeks out and punishes. It is important to note that there is a crisis of mass
incarceration in the U.S., and this crisis drives many criminal defense attorneys in the
work they do, including the author. One in every 137 Americans was in prison or jail
in 2010. Two-thirds of those incarcerated are people of color. See generally THE SEN-
TENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PRISONERS (2012), http://sentencing-
project.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_factsAboutPrisons_Jan2013.pdf;
MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL RATES OF INCAR-
CERATION: AN EXAMINATION OF CAUSES AND TRENDS (2003), http://www.sentencing-
project.org/doc/publications/inc_comparative_intl.pdf. Although no data is
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Gender Identity Disorder (GID), discussed in greater detail in
Section II, was an extremely controversial diagnosis in the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM);9 community
action and criticism led the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) to announce in December 2012 that it would remove GID
from the most recent revised edition, DSM-5, which was published
in May 2013.10 GID’s very existence is considered by some to be an
affront to transgender,11 genderqueer, and gender non-con-
forming people because it normalizes the gender binary by patho-
logizing people who don’t fit the narrow idea of the DSM authors
(and others) about what a “man” or “woman” is. However, the GID
diagnosis in the U.S. has been necessary for trans people to receive
certain essential gender-affirming medical care, or have it paid for
by insurance. This creates something of a “necessary evil” relation-
ship between the GID diagnosis and trans people who need medi-
cal services.
This Note is written from a perspective that does not accept
either that trans identity/gender-nonconformity is a pathology or
that the criminal system is a place of justice. Through this lens, it
will analyze Manning’s defense attorney’s early choice to exploit
the GID diagnosis, in the face of a movement that challenges its
available on transgender rates of incarceration, one San Francisco study found that
67% of transgender women and 30% of transgender men surveyed had a history of
incarceration. See Emily Alpert, Gender Outlaws: Transgender Prisoners Face Discrimina-
tion, Harassment, and Abuse Above and Beyond That of the Traditional Male and Female
Prison Population, IN THE FRAY (Nov. 20, 2005), http://inthefray.org/content/view/
1381/39/.
9 DSM, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (explain-
ing that the DSM was created by the American Psychiatric Association, which consid-
ers it to be the “standard classification of mental disorders”) (last visited Nov. 5,
2013); DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/
practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (explaining that
the first edition was published in 1952 and it has been revised several times since
then).
10 Zack Ford, APA Revises Manual: Being Transgender Is No Longer a Mental Disorder,
THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/12/03/1271
431/apa-revises-manual-being-transgender-is-no-longer-a-mental-disorder/.
11 The terms “transgender,” “trans,” “genderqueer,” and “gender-nonconforming”
are used throughout this Note as umbrella terms to refer to people who “transcend
gendered social roles assigned at birth based on their anatomical sex.” See Transgender
101: A Quick Guide on Being an Ally to People Who Are Transgender and Gender Non-Con-
forming, TRANSGENDER LAW PROJECT OF ILL., http://tjlp.org/TRANSGENDER101
QuickGuide.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). These terms are meant to be used analo-
gously to the term “trans*” and to be inclusive of non-cisgender identities, rather than
referring to an exclusive form of gender identity or presentation. See Outward, What
Does Trans* Mean, and Where Did It Come From?, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:37 PM),
http://www.state.com/blogs/outward/2014/01/10/trans_What_does_it_mean_and_
where_did_it_come_from.html.
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validity and existence and where another defense theory, particu-
larly a whistleblower defense, was viable. It also recognizes that a
defense attorney has an obligation to act as a zealous advocate and
use any and all arguments at her disposal to fight for a favorable
outcome for her client; it arguably should not affect her strategy if
the negative stereotypes involve an already-marginalized commu-
nity, so long as they help her client avoid jail time. The question
remains whether the defense attorney’s opinions or political or
personal motivations matter when defending someone who faces
incarceration, or whether it is paternalistic to impose her beliefs,
no matter how morally fundamental they are to her worldview, on
the people she represents. This Note will focus on this issue in the
context of both queer12 and criminal justice theories and prac-
tice—at the center of which sits Chelsea Manning.
Part I of this Note is an overview of Manning’s case and Part II
is a brief introduction to concepts of gender identity and trans ac-
tivism. Part III reviews the theories of punishment, concepts of cul-
pability, the complex role of the criminal defense attorney, and the
use of narrative storytelling in defense practice. Part IV analyzes
other defenses used to either mitigate culpability or reduce
sentences based on characteristics of the accused, from mental
health to race to gender to cultural background. Part V focuses on
past use of gender and sexuality in criminal courts. The Note con-
cludes with the author’s opinion that the wisdom of the defense
strategy in Manning’s case was questionable, although its use was
arguably ethical if Manning agreed to it.
I. THE UNITED STATES V. PFC. MANNING13
Chelsea Manning was accused of leaking over 500,000 military
12 The term queer has been reclaimed as a positive word that embraces noncon-
formance with gender and sexuality norms and celebrates a culture outside the main-
stream. It will be used in this way to describe individuals and communities throughout
the paper.
13 The military judge in Manning’s court-martial, Colonel Denise Lind, refused to
turn over transcripts, court orders, or prosecution documents filed during pre-trial
hearings for nearly three years. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), of
counsel in the U.S. to Julian Assange, filed briefs with the military trial court and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on behalf of itself and several
independent journalists and media organizations, demanding public access to all
pretrial filings, conferences, rulings, and orders. See Summary of Center for Constitutional
Rights et al. v. United States & Lind, Chief Judge, CTR. FOR CONSTUTIONAL RIGHTS, http:/
/ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/ccr-et-al-v-usa-and-lind-chief-judge (last visited
June 2, 2013). On February 27, 2013, the trial court released 86 redacted orders and
rulings. See Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, RECORDS MGMT. AND
DECLASSIFICATION AGENCY, https://www.rmda.army.mil/foia/FOIA_ReadingRoom/
2013] THE ETHICS OF G.I.D. IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 325
cables and documents—including the infamous “Collateral Mur-
der” video14—to WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website notorious for
publishing sensitive and classified information from governments
and other large organizations. She was arrested on May 26, 2010,
and locked up in a detention facility in Kuwait before being trans-
ferred to the military prison in Quantico, Virginia, known as the
Brig.15 Manning chose to hire a civilian defense attorney, David
Coombs,16 in addition to the Army Judge Advocate General (JAG)
attorney assigned to her by the military.17 The conditions of her
incarceration at the Brig prompted an investigation by the UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Torture and accusations of cruel and unusual
treatment.18
index.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). Twenty-one of the orders are “court orders for
records from mental health professionals.” Kevin Gosztola, US Army Makes Bradley
Manning Court Martial Bit Less Secretive to Avert First Amendment Ruling, THE DISSENTER
(Feb. 27, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/02/27/us-army-
makes-bradley-manning-court-martial-bit-less-secretive-to-avert-first-amendment-
ruling/. See also Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, DOD Release of Docs in
Manning Case Falls Short of Legal Requirement (Feb. 27, 2013), http://ccrjustice
.org/newsroom/press-releases/dod-release-of-docs-manning-case-falls-short-of-legal-
requirement. Importantly, media were not allowed to enter the court pressroom on
several occasions (including hearings attended by the author in July 2012), and the
public therefore has had to rely on reports by journalists who were forced to sit in the
audience and take notes by hand, without computers.
14 Collateral Murder Video, PVT. MANNING SUPPORT NETWORK, http://www.bradley
manning.org/learn-more/collateral-murder-video (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); MITCH-
ELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 18–19.
15 Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video
Probe, WIRED (June 6, 2010, 9:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/
leak/.
16 Coombs is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve but is representing Man-
ning in a civilian capacity. His attorney fees were paid by the nonprofit Pvt. Manning
Support Network and its parent organization Courage to Resist. See generally THE LAW
OFFICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS, http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info (last visited
Mar. 11, 2013); PVT. MANNING SUPPORT NETWORK, http://www.bradleymanning.org/
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
17 A person accused of a crime in military court has a right to JAG counsel, but
may also hire civilian defense counsel. 10 U.S.C.A. § 838 (West, current through P.L.
113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54 and 113-56)). See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL31262, SELECTED PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN FEDERAL, MILITARY, AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31
262.pdf.
18 David E. Coombs, PFC Manning’s Unlawful Pretrial Punishment at Quantico, THE
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.armycourtmartialde
fense.info/2012/08/unlawful-pretrial-punishment-motion_10.html; David E.
Coombs, The Truth Behind Quantico Brig’s Decision to Strip PFC Manning, THE LAW OF-
FICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/
2011/03/truth-behind-quantico-brigs-decision-to.html. See also Editors, Inhumane
Treatment of WikiLeaks Soldier Bradley Manning, HUMAN RIGHTS NOW AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011, 9:24 AM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/waronterror/in
humane-treatment-of-wikileaks-soldier-bradley-manning/; Glenn Greenwald, The In-
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Manning originally faced twenty-two charges,19 the most seri-
ous being “Aiding the Enemy,”20 a charge which reeks of treason
and carries a sentence of death, although the government prosecu-
tors have said they will “only” seek life imprisonment, not death.21
On February 28, 2013, Manning offered a guilty plea to ten lesser
included offenses that carried a maximum total sentence of twenty
years behind bars.22 The government continued to prosecute Man-
humane Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention, SALON (Dec. 15, 2010, 2:15 AM),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/14/manning/in
dex.html. Despite the fact that Brig forensic psychiatrists maintained she was not a
suicide threat, Manning was forced to sleep in only her underwear for approximately
eight months under Prevention of Injury watch. David E. Coombs, PFC Bradley Man-
ning Is Not Being Treated Like Every Other Detainee, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID E.
COOMBS (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/2011/01/pfc-
bradley-manning-is-not-being.html. After making a sarcastic comment that she could
injure herself with the band of her underwear, she was forced to be nude each night
for seven hours, from March 2 to April 20, 2011. Between March 3 and March 7,
Manning was forced to stand at attention (“parade rest”), still naked, for about three
minutes in the mornings in front of the guards, until the Duty Brig Supervisor com-
pleted his inspection rounds. See Brief for Defendant at 36, Motion to Dismiss for
Unlawful Pretrial Punishment, United States v. Manning (filed July 27, 2012) (No
docket number available), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B_zC44SBaZ
PoQ2hLa21jNlM0WmM/edit?pli=1. In a letter to Coombs, Manning described the ex-
perience of this abuse: “The guard told me to stand at parade rest, with my hands
behind my back and my legs spaced shoulder-width apart. I stood at parade rest for
about three minutes . . . . The [brig supervisor] and the other guards walked past my
cell. He looked at me, paused for a moment, then continued to the next cell. I was
incredibly embarrassed at having all these people stare at me naked.” Ed Pilkington,
Stripped Naked Every Night, Bradley Manning Tells of Prison Ordeal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/stripped-naked-bradley-
manning-prison. On January 8, 2013, Military Judge Denise Lind ordered that Man-
ning be given 112 days of sentencing credit for her time in the Brig; Coombs had
requested that the charges be dismissed on that ground. Kevin Gosztola, Judge: Bradley
Manning Punished Unlawfully But Not Enough to Warrant More Than Weak Relief, THE
DISSENTER (Jan. 8, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/01/08/
judge-bradley-manning-punished-unlawfully-but-not-enough-to-warrant-more-than-
weak-relief/.
19 MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 171–79. See also Manning Charge Sheet,
N.Y. TIMES, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20110302-man
ning.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
20 10 U.S.C.A. § 904 (West, current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54
and 113-56)) (“Any person who . . . aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms,
ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; or . . . without proper authority, know-
ingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds
with or holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly . . . shall
suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may
direct.” Id. (emphasis added)).
21 See About Pvt. Manning, PVT. MANNING SUPPORT NETWORK, http://www.bradley
manning.org/learn-more/bradley-manning (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
22 David E. Coombs, PFC Manning’s Written Statement in Support of His Guilty Plea,
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.armycourtmar-
tialdefense.info/2013/03/pfc-mannings-written-statement-in.html (“Through his plea
2013] THE ETHICS OF G.I.D. IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 327
ning on the remaining charges, including the Aiding the Enemy
charge; Manning chose to be tried by a military judge alone, not a
jury.23 On June 3, 2013, after more than three years in military de-
tention, Manning’s court-martial began, and on July 30, 2013, she
was cleared of the Aiding the Enemy charge but found guilty of five
espionage charges, for which she was sentenced to thirty-five years
in prison.24
A. Article 32 Hearing—Manning’s First Appearance in Court
This Note is primarily concerned with the earliest defense
strategies presented by Coombs during the Article 32 hearing be-
tween December 16 and December 22, 2011. A pretrial investiga-
tory hearing, called an Article 32 hearing, is required to ensure
there are sufficient facts to support a prosecution for the offense(s)
charged.25 The hearing differs most significantly from a state or
federal criminal court grand jury indictment in that the person ac-
cused has access to the proceeding and may see the evidence
against her, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments, and is
thus an opportunity for the defense to both glean discovery and to
present testimony and evidence.26 In this case, the hearing pro-
vided the first glimpse of Manning’s defense strategy.
Coombs focused heavily on Manning’s sexual orientation and
gender identity, coupled with narratives about her mental and
emotional health, as factors mitigating her culpability.27 The goal
of guilty, PFC Manning has accepted responsibility for his actions of releasing infor-
mation to Wikileaks. PFC Manning did not plead guilty pursuant to a ‘plea bargain’
or ‘plea deal’ with the Government.”).
23 David E. Coombs, Pfc. Manning’s Offered Plea and Forum Selection, THE LAW OF-
FICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/
2012/11/pfc-mannings-offered-plea-and-forum.html.
24 See Bill Chappell, Bradley Manning Court-Martial Begins in WikiLeaks Case, NPR
(June 3, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/03/
188404967/bradley-manning-court-martial-begins-in-wikileaks-case; Ed Pilkington,
Bradley Manning Verdict: Cleared of ‘Aiding the Enemy’ but Guilty of Other Charges, GUARD-
IAN (July 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/30/bradley-man-
ning-wikileaks-judge-verdict; Paul Courson & Matt Smith, WikiLeaks Source Manning
Gets 35 Years, Will Seek Pardon, CNN (Aug. 22, 2013, 6:38 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/08/21/us/bradley-manning-sentencing/.
25 See 10 U.S.C.A § 832 (West, current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54
and 113-56)); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 6, at R.C.M. § 405. See also R.
CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41739, MILITARY JUSTICE: COURTS-MARTIAL,
AN OVERVIEW 2 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41739.pdf.
26 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 6, at R.C.M. § 405.
27 Coombs spent the first day of the hearing making an oral motion for the recusal
of the investigating officer, Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, on the ground that his position as a
senior prosecutor with the Department of Justice—which was engaged in an ongoing
investigation of Manning and WikiLeaks—caused a conflict of interest. See Phil
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was both to shift the responsibility to Manning’s supervisors for not
revoking her security clearance or discharging her because of her
emotional distress (which was attributed to her gender identity),28
and also to support a diminished capacity defense by showing Man-
ning did not have the intent to aid the “enemy,” which the 10
U.S.C. § 904 statute requires.
At the hearing, Coombs questioned Army investigators about
whether they were aware of Manning’s cyber “alter ego” (Breanna
Manning), or that Manning had sent an email to her supervisor
SFC Paul Adkins in April 2010 stating that she suffered from GID,
including a photograph of herself in traditionally feminine cloth-
ing.29 One investigator who searched Manning’s home after the ar-
rest testified, upon questioning by Coombs, that she discovered a
pamphlet about facial feminization and gender reassignment sur-
geries and a study entitled “Transsexuals in the Military: Flight into
Hypermasculinity.”30 When the prosecutor challenged the rele-
vance of this line of questioning, Coombs replied that the ques-
tions “were relevant to whether Pfc. Manning had diminished
capacity at the time of the alleged offenses,” and therefore lacked
the intent necessary to establish the charges.31
Coombs also questioned witnesses about Manning’s emotional
health while in the service.32 Manning’s team supervisor, Specialist
Jihrleah Showman, testified about an incident in March 2009,
where Manning became upset after being told she needed to re-
ceive counseling before being deployed in October 2009.33 After
that incident, Showman and Adkins met with Manning to check in;
Fornaci & Jane Zara, Inside a Military Court Hearing: How the Government Is Railroading
Bradley Manning, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 3, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://truth-out.org/news/
item/8297-inside-a-military-court-hearing-how-the-government-is-railroading-bradley-
manning.
28 Josh Gerstein, Defense Cites Bradley Manning’s Emotional, Gender Issues at Wikileaks
Hearing, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2011, 9:13 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1211/70597.html.
29 Adkins never reported this email. Id. See also Kevin Gosztola, More Evidence at
Manning Hearing on Sgt. Adkins’ Dereliction of Duty, THE DISSENTER (Dec. 20, 2011, 1:32
PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2011/12/20/more-evidence-at-manning-
hearing-on-sgt-adkins%E2%80%99-dereliction-of-duty/.
30 MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 99–100.
31 Gerstein, supra note 28 (internal quotes omitted). See also Serena Marshall, Brad-
ley Manning: Judge Denies Dismissal, Sets Trial Date, ABC NEWS’ THE NOTE (Apr. 25,
2012, 11:56 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/bradley-manning-
judge-denies-dismissal-sets-trial-date/.
32 See MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 105.
33 Gosztola, supra note 29. Showman informed Adkins of this incident, recom-
mending nonjudicial action, but Adkins did not follow the recommendation; Show-
man also recommended that Manning not be deployed. See cf. Kim Zetter, Army Was
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Showman testified that Manning said she “really felt paranoid be-
cause [she] felt people were listening and watching [her] every
move.”34 In December 2009, after being deployed, Manning
flipped over a table and broke a computer; she was restrained by a
fellow soldier based on a fear that she would use a weapon that was
in the room.35 After this event, Showman informed Adkins that she
felt Manning’s security clearance should be revoked, and Adkins
did not take action.36 In May 2010, Showman saw Manning in the
fetal position after a therapy session; a few hours later, Manning
allegedly hit her after Showman confronted her, and Showman
then pinned Manning to the ground.37 While on the ground, Man-
ning told her “[she] was tired of everyone trying to fix [her] and
tired of everyone watching [her]. And, if [she] told behavioral
health the truth, that would mean [she] would be removed from
the army.”38 This statement was assumed to relate either to Man-
ning’s sexuality or gender identity.39
During closing arguments, Coombs declared that GID “is an
unfortunate term. It is not a disorder. When a person looks in the
mirror and they do not feel that the person they are looking at is
the gender they are, that’s not a disorder. That’s reality.”40 He then
read Manning’s letter to her supervisor, Adkins (who refused to
testify, invoking the right against self-incrimination), which de-
scribed Manning’s struggles with gender identity, her initial wish
that the military would help her, and the subsequent realization
that she could not get help from family or supervisors while in the
military.41 Coombs emphasized that Manning was not adequately
supported by her supervisors, who did next to nothing to help
Manning after learning of her emotional distress.42 Coombs then
recounted other incidents which he claimed indicated that Man-
ning was not emotionally stable, including carving “I want” into a
chair with a knife.43 The prosecution, by contrast, did not mention
Warned Not to Deploy Bradley Manning to Iraq, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/army-warned-about-manning/.
34 Gosztola, supra note 29.
35 Id. See also MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 106.




40 MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 142.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 142–43.
43 Id. at 143–44. Coombs concluded by offering a completely different argument,
which was that the leaks had not caused any actual harm. Id.
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Manning’s emotional or behavioral concerns at all in its closing; it
focused solely on the classified information that was leaked and
how it intended to prove that Manning was the one who leaked it.44
One month after the Article 32 hearing, on February 3, 2012, the
convening officer referred all twenty-two charges to a general
court-martial.45
B. Subsequent Hearings and Strategies
After the Article 32 hearing, Coombs did not rely heavily on
Manning’s gender identity and emotional health, and instead
shifted tactics entirely. After steadily chipping away at the prosecu-
tors’ case for months,46 Coombs and Manning unveiled a proper
whistleblower defense on February 27, 2013, when Manning read a
statement admitting she leaked the cables and voluntarily pleading
guilty to lesser included offenses related to her actions.47 By taking
“full responsibility” for providing the materials to WikiLeaks, Man-
ning confirmed that she knew what she was doing when she leaked
44 Id. at 144–47.
45 Bradley Manning: US General Orders Court Martial for WikiLeaks Suspect, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/bradley-manning-
court-martial-wikileaks. The general court-martial is reserved for the most serious of-
fenses and is the only type at which charges carrying death may be heard. See Pollack,
supra note 6, at 5.
46 For more information about other defense strategies employed since the Article
32 hearing, many of which do not rely on speculations or assumptions about Man-
ning’s gender identity, see generally THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info. Other major and independent me-
dia outlets have been closely following the case. See, e.g., Chelsea Manning (Formerly
Bradley Manning) Article Archive,  GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/chel-
sea-manning (last visited Nov. 29, 2013); Pfc. Manning Archive, ALEXAOBRIEN.COM,
http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/ (last visited
Nov. 29, 2013) (compiling links to documents, articles, and other files connected to
the case); Kevin Gosztola, Pvt. Manning Coverage, THE DISSENTER, http://dis-
senter.firedoglake.com/tag/bradley-manning/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2013); Pvt. Man-
ning Coverage, NATION, http://www.thenation.com/search/apachesolr_search/brad
ley%20manning and http://www.thenation.com/search/apachesolr_search/chelsea
%20manning (last visited Nov. 29, 2013); Bradley Manning Archive, DEMOCRACY NOW!,
http://www.democracynow.org/topics/bradley_manning (last visited Nov. 29, 2013);
Bradley Manning Archive, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/category/bradley-
manning/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). Mainstream media coverage has been much
more sporadic, with The New York Times being marginally more consistent than others.
See, e.g., Articles About Bradley Manning, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/m/bradley_e_manning/index.html (last visited Apr.
8, 2013).
47 Alexa O’Brien, Pfc. Bradley E. Manning’s Statement for the Providence Inquiry, ALEX-
AOBRIEN.COM (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/
wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement
.html (audio and transcript of Manning statement).
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the materials and that she did so for moral and political purposes,
as a whistleblower.48
Although the whistleblower defense became the official strat-
egy, the early use of Manning’s gender identity as a defense strat-
egy to mitigate Manning’s culpability raised eyebrows and
prompted much criticism and this criticism remains relevant in an
ethical analysis of the strategy. What was said and done cannot be
unsaid or undone, and the public (and potentially judicial) re-
sponse to the early strategy serves as a lesson to those of us commit-
ted to both social justice and individual defense.
Upon examination, the strategy appears to have been em-
ployed in the context of a hearing in which nearly all the defense
requests for discovery were denied, including those for exculpatory
evidence.49 Additionally, the defense had requested forty-seven wit-
nesses50 but was allowed only two, while the prosecution was al-
lowed to call twenty-one witnesses.51 Through this lens, the tactic
may have been born more of desperation than intentional strategy.
Coombs made an early choice between two defense theories,
neither of which was ideal. First, there was a story about an iso-
lated, emotionally unstable, young trans person who attempted to
go through the chain of command and get help from supervisors
but was ignored. In this story, the prosecutor could not establish
the “intent” required by the Aiding the Enemy statute because
Manning suffered from a psychiatric disorder and thus had dimin-
ished capacity and was not responsible for her actions. The second
story is that of a freedom-fighting whistleblower who saw war
crimes being committed by the military in the midst of an unjust
war and was compelled to expose them. Here, Manning was cogni-
zant of her actions, but was justified in so acting because of the
immorality of the war in Iraq and the military industrial complex.
As it turns out, Manning’s experience was an amalgamation of the
48 See Kevin Gosztola, Bradley Manning Pleads Guilty to Some Offenses (Updates), THE
DISSENTER (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:00 PM); Spencer Ackerman, Bradley Manning Takes “Full
Responsibility” for Giving WikiLeaks Huge Government Data Trove, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2013,
4:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/02/bradley-manning/; Scott
Shane, Soldier to Face More Serious Charges in Leak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/us/manning-to-face-more-serious-charges-in-leak
.html; Floyd Abrams & Yochai Benkler, Death to Whistle-Blowers?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/opinion/the-impact-of-the-bradley-
manning-case.html.
49 MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 104.
50 David E. Coombs, Defense Witness List, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID E. COOMBS,
http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/2011/12/defense-witness-list.html (follow
“witness list” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
51 MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 148.
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two stories. To determine if Coombs was justified in his decision to
rely on GID, it is crucial to analyze the diagnosis and its stigma,
implications, and impacts on trans people.
II. CAN GENDER IDENTITY “MAKE” A PERSON AID THE ENEMY?
Before Manning’s gender and sexuality were raised by
Coombs, they were raised in the court of public opinion—the me-
dia. The New York Times ran an article soon after Manning’s arrest
which traced her childhood from rural Oklahoma, to rural Wales,
where classmates made fun of her “for being gay,” to the Army,
where she was forced to conceal her sexuality.52 The article boldly
postulated that “some of [Manning’s] friends say they wonder
whether [her] desperation for acceptance—or delusions of gran-
deur—may have led [her] to disclose the largest trove of govern-
ment secrets since the Pentagon Papers.”53
The media’s focus on Manning’s gender identity led some to
question—what exactly did her gender identity, even if coupled
with severe emotional distress about it, have to do with a capital
charge of aiding enemy terrorists?54 The fact that Coombs did not
immediately use a whistleblower defense, in light of Manning’s
clear statements in the chat logs that her actions were motivated by
political conscience,55 was publicly criticized:
The emotional problems of loneliness and alienation Manning
confronted are hardly atypical for a perceptive 20-year-old, par-
ticularly one with a long-estranged father dealing with issues of
sexual orientation and gender identity who, after being raised in
a tiny evangelical community in Oklahoma, finds himself
deployed to Baghdad as part of the U.S. Army’s brutal war in
Iraq . . . . The notion that these reactions to wholly unjustified,
massive blood-spilling is psychologically warped is itself warped.
The reactions described there are psychologically healthy; it’s
52 Ginger Thompson, Early Struggles of Soldier Charged in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/us/09manning.html. See also Steve
Fishman, Bradley Manning’s Army of One, N.Y. MAGAZINE, July 3, 2011, available at http:/
/nymag.com/news/features/bradley-manning-2011-7/.
53 Thompson, supra note 52.
54 Mike Brunker, Manning Defense’s Focus on Gender Identity Disorder Alarms Some,
NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 21, 2011, 6:28 AM), http://openchannel.msnbc.msn.com/
_news/2011/12/21/9590399-manning-defenses-focus-on-gender-identity-disorder-
alarms-some. See also MITCHELL & GOSZTOLA, supra note 5, at 138; Manuel, supra note
7.
55 Hansen, supra note 7 (“[I]nformation should be free / it belongs in the public
domain / because another state would just take advantage of the information . . . try
and get some edge / if its [sic] out in the open . . . it should be a public good” . . . .).
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far more psychologically disturbed NOT to have the reactions
Manning had.56
A. The Whistleblower Defense
Several commentators called attention to the logical links be-
tween a whistleblower and being queer and/or trans. Lieutenant
Daniel Choi, an opponent of DADT, said about Manning, “I’m
proud of him, as a gay soldier, because he stood for integrity . . .
the gay community is [the] only one that bases its membership . . .
on integrity and telling the truth.”57 Choi also said: “That Bradley
voiced his concerns proves he was the least unstable and most
moral of all the members of his team. That he happens to be gay or
transgender gives our community a new hero who brings great
credit to the moral force of our people in this world.”58 Other com-
mentators noted that “queer activists have long known, there is
power and transcendence in choosing truth, even when that truth
makes others uncomfortable”;59 that queer people should support
Manning because “many of us have firsthand experience with be-
ing abused by the state”; and that her actions were in line with the
“anti-war, anti-establishment values the gay movement used to
champion before becoming more narrowly focused on marriage
equality and the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”60
However, some within the LGBT community did not consider
Manning’s actions heroic. For military assimilationists, “Manning
doesn’t fit into the affluent, we-are-just-like-you vision of gay nor-
malcy . . . . He’s not the poster boy for the campaign they’ve been
running for gays in the military.”61 A spokesperson for the Trans-
56 Glenn Greenwald, The Motives of Bradley Manning, SALON (July 4, 2011, 8:05 AM)
http://www.salon.com/2011/07/04/manning_11/.
57 Eliza Gray, How Bradley Manning Became a Gay Martyr, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 21
2012), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/106382/how-bradley-manning-became-gay-
martyr.
58 Dan Choi, We Must Stand with Bradley Manning, MYFDL (July 14, 2011, 2:49 PM),
http://my.firedoglake.com/danchoi/2011/07/14/dan-choi-we-must-stand-with-brad-
ley-manning/.
59 Reitman, supra note 1.
60 Gray, supra note 57.
61 Id. See also Larry Goldsmith, Bradley Manning: Rich Man’s War, Poor (Gay) Man’s
Fight, COMMON DREAMS (June 7, 2011), https://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/
06/07-6 (“Bradley Manning is not that butch patriotic homosexual, so central to the
gays-in-the-military campaign, who Defends Democracy and Fights Terrorism with a
virility indistinguishable from that of his straight buddies . . . . Having grown up in a
dysfunctional family in a small town in the South, he is that lonely, maladjusted out-
sider many gay people have been, or are, or recognize, whether we wish to admit it or
not. He broke the law, the President says. And he did so . . . because he wasn’t man
enough to deal with the pressure. . . . This is, of course, the classic argument about
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gender American Veteran’s Association (TAVA) stated that
“[d]espite all of our discrimination, I don’t think that it occurred
to any of us once to sell out our country because of that. . . . We’re
not supporting him . . . or her.”62 The Executive Director of the
Log Cabin Republicans (LCR) said:
This shameful defense is an offense to the tens of thousands of
gay servicemembers who served honorably under [DADT]. We
all served under the same law, with the same challenges and
struggles. We did not commit treason because of it. . . .
. . . For [Coombs] to suggest that [Manning’s] orientation and/
or gender identity be part of a defense or excuse for misbehav-
ior is as unacceptable as the use of a “gay panic” defense by a
murderer.63
While TAVA and LCR clearly felt Manning’s actions were mor-
ally wrong and that Coombs’s strategic use of Manning’s gender
and sexuality tarnished the image of LGBT people seeking accept-
ance in the military, others opposed the defense because it relied
on GID as a psychiatric disorder, linking it to the seemingly insult-
ing concept of “diminished capacity.”
B. Gender Identity—Disorder?
Before analyzing the DSM diagnosis of GID, it is important to
define key terminology and distinguish concepts.64 “Gender iden-
tity” refers to each person’s subjective understanding of themselves
as being men, women, a combination of those, or neither, and can
change and evolve over time. Gender identity is distinct from a per-
son’s biological sex, which also exists on a continuum from male to
female.65 “Transgender” is an umbrella term that can be used to
describe a person “whose gender identity and/or expression . . .
does not or is perceived to not match stereotypical gender norms
gays and national security—they’ll get beat up or blackmailed and reveal our
secrets.”).
62 Adam Klasfeld, Gender Politics in Manning-Wikileaks Case, Courthouse News Ser-
vice (Mar. 13, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/03/13/
44632.htm.
63 R. Clarke Cooper, Manning’s Defense Dishonors Gay GI’s, STARS AND STRIPES (Dec.
21, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/manning-s-defense-dishonors-gay-gis-1.164136.
64 See Transgender 101, supra note 11; Trans 101, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, availa-
ble at http://srlp.org/resources/trans-101/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
65 The terms “intersex” and “disorders of sex development” are both used to de-
scribe several circumstances under which people’s bodies do not fall squarely within
the male/female binary rubric. See Glossary of Terms, ACCORD ALLIANCE, http://www
.accordalliance.org/learn-about-dsd/glossary.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). See also
INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, www.isna.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
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associated with [their] assigned gender at birth.”66 “Sexual orienta-
tion” is entirely distinct, referring to whom a person is attracted. A
deviation from the “norm” within each of these categories may re-
sult in a person being diagnosed with a mental disorder listed in
the DSM.67 “Homosexuality” as a psychiatric diagnosis was not re-
moved from the DSM until 1973.68 However, the first edition that
did not include homosexuality (DSM-III) introduced GID in chil-
dren as a diagnosis, making it clear that gender conformity was of
more concern than a person’s sexual activity.69
The GID diagnosis has been contested by medical profession-
als70 and rejected by some trans and queer advocates because it
enforces an artificial norm of gender appropriateness and hetero-
normativity.71 Scholar and activist Dean Spade has criticized the
“gatekeeping role that medical providers occupy in the lives of
trans people . . . [where] medical evidence is required for various
66 SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, supra note 64 (“Transgender people have an enor-
mous and beautiful gender diversity. Among transgender as among non-transgender
people, there are feminine women, masculine women, androgynous women, femi-
nine men, androgynous men, masculine men, to name just a few. There are infinitely
different ways to be male and infinitely different ways to be female. And there are
infinite ways to be neither.”).
67 Arlene Istar Lev, Disordering Gender Identity: Gender identity disorder in the DSM-IV-
TR, 17 J. OF PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 35, 38 (2005), available at http://choicescon-
sulting.com/assets/Disordering_Gender_Identity_JOURNAL.pdf.
68 Facts About Homosexuality and Mental Health, U.C. DAVIS, http://psychology.uc
davis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_mental_health.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
69 Ellen K. Feder, Power/Knowledge, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 55, 64 (Di-
anna Taylor ed., 2011). In the previous iteration of the DSM, GID was diagnosed if a
person met four criteria: 1) “A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not
merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex)”; 2)
“[p]ersistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gen-
der role of that sex”; 3) “[t]he disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex
condition”; and 4) “[t]he disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impair-
ment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL IV-TR, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/as-
set_upload_file155_30369.pdf. Section 302.6 Gender Identity Disorder in Children.
Section 302.85 Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults. GID was removed
from the DSM-5 in 2013.
70 Lev, supra note 67, at 36–37.
71 Dean Spade, Law as Tactics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 40, 48 (2012) (“The
diagnostic criteria of Gender Identity Disorder produces a fiction of a naturalized,
untroubled binary gender identity for non-trans people, including a gender-appropri-
ate childhood filled with gender-appropriate toys, role plays and friends. The exis-
tence of the criteria, we have also asserted, establishes a mechanism of surveillance by
creating a category of deviance that gender non-normative behavior can trigger,
which has often particularly led to involuntary psychiatric treatment in young peo-
ple.”). See also Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 275 (Paisley
Currah et al., eds. 2006) (noting that GID serves to “pathologize as a mental disorder
what ought to be understood instead as one among many human possibilities of de-
termining one’s gender for oneself”).
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forms of recognition of a trans person’s gender identity or eligibil-
ity for treatment . . .  determining which of us are true . . . .”72
Michel Foucault also recognized the role that medical normaliza-
tion plays in controlling the lives of those deemed “other” by the
medical establishment.73 Others criticize the diagnosis because of
how it may be perceived: “[f]or conservatives, [the GID diagnosis]
provided rhetorical carte blanche to describe the entire trans
[community] as disordered, delusional, and mentally ill.”74 Some
claim the existence of the disorder itself inflicts emotional and psy-
chological harm on children and adults who are gender noncon-
forming, where they otherwise may not experience such internal
distress about their gender.75
Such critiques76 and direct advocacy eventually led to the APA
publishing two position statements, one titled “Access to Care for
Transgender and Gender Variant Individuals” and the other “Dis-
crimination Against Transgender and Gender Variant Individu-
als.”77 Then, in December 2012, the APA Board of Trustees
approved major changes to the DSM, which included the removal
of the diagnosis “Gender Identity Disorder” from DSM-5, which
was published in May 2013.78 A new diagnosis has been put in its
72 Spade, supra note 71, at 48. Spade makes clear that the fallacy that medical
providers are greater experts on people’s gender than those people themselves results
“in the enforcement of rigid gender norms on trans bodies with doctors
often requiring performances of hyper masculinity and femininity read
through straight, white, upper class norms. Those who fail to meet the
arbitrary, subjective criteria of their medical providers are frequently de-
nied access to care. . . . [T]hese criteria and relationships of authority
[are] technologies of the production of gender normativity in which
trans bodies experience intensified surveillance and correction.”
Id. at 49.
73 See Feder, supra note 69, at 62 (“Normalization, the institutionalization of the
norm, of what counts as normal, indicates the pervasive standards that structure and
define social meaning.” There has been a shift from “a focus on health understood as
qualities specific to an individual, to normality, a standard imposed from without.”).
74 Ford, supra note 10.
75 Butler, supra note 71, at 280 (“[W]e have to ask whether submitting to the diag-
nosis does not involve, more or less consciously, a certain subjection to the diagnosis
such that one does end up internalizing some aspect of the diagnosis, conceiving of
oneself as mentally ill or ‘failing’ in normality, or both.”).
76 There are others. See, e.g., Gender Identity Disorder and the DSM, NATIONAL ASSOCI-
ATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, http://www.socialworkers.org/diversity/new/lgbtq/51810
.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); GENDER IDENTITY REFORM ADVOCATES, http://gidre
form.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
77 See Kelley Winters, The American Psychiatric Association Issues Historic Position State-
ments on Trans Issues, GID REFORM WEBLOG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://gidreform.word
press.com/2012/08/20/the-american-psychiatric-association-issues-historic-position-
statements-on-trans-issues/.
78 See J. Bryan Lowder, Being Transgender Is No Longer a Disorder: The American Psychi-
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place, however: “Gender Dysphoria” refers to a temporary state of
acute emotional distress people may experience about their gen-
der identity, resulting in “a marked incongruence between one’s
experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender,”79 as op-
posed to GID’s overarching pathological disordering.80
While many called this a step forward for the trans commu-
nity, others call attention to the crucial other side of the debate,
which is that a diagnosis of GID provides needed medical legiti-
macy for trans individuals who seek necessary gender-affirming
medical treatment such as hormone therapy and surgery, as well as
individuals who find themselves caught up in institutional settings
which categorize people based on sex and gender, such as prisons,
treatment facilities, and shelters.81 A diagnosis of GID is necessary
to receive any hormone therapy or surgical procedures under the
Harry Benjamin Standards of Care,82 and is the strongest line of
defense for trans people who are incarcerated—most often trans-
gender women of color—to demand access to necessary medical
treatment in the face of a prison system that so often denies neces-
sary care to those who are locked up.83 Queer theorist Judith But-
ler argues that, unless an alternative means of accessing necessary
health care for low-income trans people is put in place, GID must
be used strategically to pursue such treatment.84
atric Association Salutes the T in LGBT, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2012/12/dsm_revision_and_
sexual_identity_gender_identity_disorder_replaced_by_gender.html.
79 See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender Dysphoria,’
ADVOCATE (July 23, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/
2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria.
80 Id.
81 See Chase Strangio, Debating ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ and Justice for Trans People,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chase-
strangio/gender-identity-disorder-dsm_b_2247081.html; see also Lev, supra note 67, at
37; Butler, supra note 71, at 281; JOEY L. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK,
QUEER (IN) JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
107–10 (Michael Bronski ed. 2011).
82 See HARRY BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, THE STAN-
DARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS (5th ed. 1998), available at http://
www.tc.umn.edu/~colem001/hbigda/hstndrd.
83 Strangio, supra note 81 (“[M]edical control over trans bodies and lives will al-
ways be most dangerous and violent for our community members in prison, jail, de-
tention, homeless shelters and psychiatric hospitals and institutions. The removal of
GID or its changing construction might help to further distance some (most likely
white, wealthy, male-identified) trans people from external control over their access
to affirming care, while simultaneously subjecting other trans people (low-income,
incarcerated, people of color, female-identified) to enhanced control.”).
84 See Butler, supra note 71, at 288. See also Strangio, supra note 81 (“[I]t is helpful
to think about what we want from the law and discrete benefits systems and advocate
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C. Trans in the Military
Coombs’ decision to rely on Manning’s transgender identity,
in a military setting infamous for being one of the most trans- and
homophobic institutions in the U.S.,85 was troubling. The repeal of
DADT had no effect on trans people in the military, who must re-
main officially in the closet to either enlist or avoid discharge,86
and who suffer abuse and harassment from others enlisted regard-
less of whether they have expressly come out or not. Discrimina-
tion has been described as disparate, with “masculinity in women
[being] more acceptable than expressed femininity in men.”87 Dis-
charge for “sexual gender and identity disorders” is considered ad-
ministrative, not medical, and therefore people who are
discharged on these grounds may not access gender-affirming
medical treatment through the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA).88 The military, even more than the psychiatric establishment,
strictly enforces gender norms through dress and grooming poli-
cies.89 A deviation from what the military considers “gender appro-
priate” clothing can result in a person being charged with “cross-
dressing” and being subjected to discipline or criminal
prosecution.90
from that standpoint centering the most vulnerable in our communities rather than
looking to those systems to reflect our identities back to us in ways that is most af-
firming.”); Spade, supra note 71, at 51 n.32 (suggesting treatment of “gender confirm-
ing health care for trans people” more like pregnancy, “something that happens to
some bodies and requires care but is not an illness or pathology. . . . [T]rans identity
need not be considered ‘disordered’ in order for health services to be considered
necessary.”).
85 The military has openly discriminated based on sex, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion through limits on who can join the military and the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy.
See Klasfeld, supra note 62; Klasfeld, supra note 1.
86 See FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 2, at 29. Enlisting in the military requires
undergoing a physical examination, and a person can be disqualified for any surgeries
deemed to create “major abnormalities and defects of the genitalia.” DEP’T OF DE-
FENSE, INSTRUCTION 6130.03, MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT, ENLISTMENT, OR
INDUCTION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES ¶¶ E4.14(e) & E4.15(l) (2010), available at http:/
/www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/613003p.pdf. Further, “transsexualism”
and “transvestism” are considered “psychosexual conditions” which disqualify a per-
son seeking to enlist. Id. ¶ E4.28(r).
87 Katie Miller, The New DADT: The Military’s Ban on Transgender Service, OUTSERVE
(Jan. 31, 2012) http://outservemag.com/2012/01/the-new-dadt-the-militarys-ban-on-
transgender-service/.
88 FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 2, at 30. But see DEP’T OF VET. AFF., VHA DIREC-
TIVE 2013-2003, PROVIDING HEALTH CARE FOR TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX VETERANS
(2013), available at http://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=
2863 (establishing policy guidelines for the “respectful delivery of healthcare” to
transgender and intersex veterans enrolled in or eligible to receive VA care).
89 See FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 2, at 29.
90 Id. at 29–30.
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Viewing Manning’s case through the lens of trans advocacy
and the critiques of GID, it is important to consider next the sys-
tem of punishment Manning faces and the role Coombs plays as
defense counsel. While Manning is not being tried in the Article III
criminal system, the military criminal system is analogous in impor-
tant ways.91 The next section will explore the complex role of de-
fense counsel, the rights of people accused of crimes vis-à-vis their
attorneys, and how the two coalesce in the development of defense
strategies.
III. THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM AND THE COMPLICATED ROLE
OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY
The conundrum of how to serve both the individual client and
the larger community is one that has troubled social justice lawyers
and led to movements in radical and community lawyering in the
civil context.92 The challenge comes to an ethical head in the
realm of criminal defense work. Different schools of thought have
emerged to grapple with the question of what a criminal defense
attorney should do when the interests of her client conflict with or
cause harm to the interests of others, particularly marginalized and
oppressed communities. As one leading theorist has phrased the
issue, must a defense attorney “refrain from zealous advocacy, or
even subvert their clients’ cases, whenever the social good of doing
so outweighs the moral costs”?93
This section will first examine justifications for punishment,
which are helpful to frame an analysis about effective defense tac-
tics. Next, it will review the role of the defense attorney and the
rights of people accused of crimes vis-à-vis their attorneys, high-
lighting conflicts that can emerge when developing a defense strat-
egy, and the rules that govern—to an extent—when counsel and
client disagree. Finally, this section will examine two schools of
thought that grapple with such conflicts: those who believe in zeal-
91 Procedural safeguards shared by Article III courts and general courts-martial
include, among others, the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent,
and—most relevantly for this note—the right to effective assistance of counsel (dis-
cussed in more detail below in Section III.B). MASON, supra note 25, at 9–10. See also
ELSEA, supra note 17.
92 See, e.g., Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi & Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans
Liberation: Building A Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 579 (2010); Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to Addressing
Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant Communities, 8 N.Y.U.J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y. 35, 48–51 (2004).
93 David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1758
(1993).
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ous advocacy at all costs on behalf of individual clients, and those
who believe that dignity-based, anti-humiliation, anti-subordination
principles should guide individual representation in a way that is
ultimately and primarily accountable to the larger community.
Each perspective will be discussed in turn.
A. Why Do We Punish?
Two recognized theoretical justifications for punishment in
American criminal law are utilitarianism and retributivism. Utilita-
rian theory views punishment as a harm to be avoided, focusing on
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation94 to maximize social
good and minimize future crime. Retributivism, by contrast, is a
backwards-looking theory focused on morality-based punishment:
wrongdoers should be punished because they deserve it—they get
their “just deserts”—not because it will result in fewer crimes.95 In
both contexts, the question remains: should a person be punished
for involuntary acts? For retributivists, punishment is only deserved
if the wrongdoer chose to violate a rule of society—involuntary ac-
tions are not subject to the same eagerness to punish. On the other
hand, utilitarianism “can [be used to] justify the punishment of a
person known to be innocent of wrongdoing.”96
Michel Foucault theorized that a main justification for punish-
ment and imprisonment was to create “docile bodies . . . bodies
that were both efficient in performance and obedient to author-
94 Proponents of utilitarianism view punishment as the means to achieve the goal
of general deterrence (punishing one person deters others from committing similar
acts) as well as specific deterrence by incapacitation (being locked up and prevented
from misconduct), intimidation (people are afraid of incarceration and conform
their behavior to the law to avoid punishment), and rehabilitating the defendant to
help him to reform his actions. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
14–15 (5th ed. 2009).
95 Three main subsets of retributivism are theoretically prominent. The first is re-
venge-based, whereby the victim uses the state to take out his anger and hatred of the
wrongdoer. The second subset views punishment as a way of achieving “social bal-
ance” in a society where one of its members has breached the social contract by
choosing not to be burdened with rules that otherwise benefit everyone. The third
subset sees punishment as a means to right a wrong—getting even by making the
victim whole through the punishment of the perpetrator. See DRESSLER, supra note 94,
at 14–19. See also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors
and the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 638–43
(2004) (providing an overview of utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment);
CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 6–7 (2d ed.
2009) (same).
96 DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 20.
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ity.”97 Prisons discipline the bodies of those locked up within them
by manipulating, classifying, examining, and constantly surveilling
them; this discipline “make[s] them more useful for mass produc-
tion and at the same time easier to control.”98 According to Fou-
cault, normalization is also a goal of punishment, as prisons were
ostensibly designed to “inscribe the norms of the society in the
bodies of criminals by subjecting them to reconstructed patterns of
behaviour.”99 The military’s punishment system recognizes disci-
pline explicitly as a modus operandi: “it might be said that disci-
pline is as important as liberty interests.”100
B. The Rights of People Accused of Crimes and the Role of Defense
Counsel
Once involved in the criminal or military punishment system,
a person facing jail or prison time arguably needs the assistance of
counsel to navigate those intentionally complex legal systems; in
this light, the role of the defense attorney is to keep her clients
from being locked inside a cage in jail or prison for any amount of
time.101 How forcefully a defense attorney should counsel her cli-
ent with regards to a particular defense strategy to that end is de-
batable. Crucially, the role of defense counsel is to advocate for her
client regardless of whether the person is guilty or innocent.
People accused of crimes have a right to effective assistance of
counsel, both in military and state criminal courts.102 Effective assis-
tance is often referred to in terms of how the defense attorney per-
97 Todd May, Foucault’s Conception of Freedom, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
71, 75–76 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011).
98 Johanna Oksala, Freedom and Bodies, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 85, 87
(Dianna Taylor ed., 2011).
99 Id. at 89.
100 MASON, supra note 25, at 2.
101 With regards to representing transgender people who face incarceration, it
must be noted that “verbal harassment, physical abuse, and sexual assault and coer-
cion create an exceptionally dangerous climate for transgender, gender non-con-
forming, and intersex people in prison,” particularly for transgender people of color
who are most likely to be locked up. THE SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, IT’S WAR IN
HERE 26 (2007), available at http://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf.
102 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (finding that to estab-
lish that their attorney was ineffective, the person represented must show that 1) the
attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and
2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different”). See also McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); ELSEA, supra note 17 (noting that in the military court con-
text, a defendant’s appointed counsel must be “certified as qualified and may not be
someone who has taken any part in the investigation or prosecution, unless explicitly
requested by the defendant” (citing 10 U.S.C. § 827)).
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forms during trial, but one area that has been studied, debated,
and affected by recent Supreme Court decisions, is the extension
of the duty of effective assistance to pre-trial counseling with re-
spect to whether to go to trial or take a plea.103 When counseling a
client about whether or not to take a plea, defense counsel may
utilize varying degrees of persuasion—from remaining neutral and
making suggestions to advising and even urging.104 Neutrality com-
ports with a client-centered model of defense lawyering, but the
Second Circuit found that such a “hands-off” approach did not rise
to the level of effective assistance.105 Another key concern with re-
gards to deciding the appropriate level of persuasion is “[t]he dan-
ger[ ] of paternalism, and the attorney’s subordination of her
client,” to the attorney’s own ideas of what is best for her client.106
The ethical rules themselves are mere guideposts—the answer
to the debate comes down to personal ethics.107 While the person
accused has the “ultimate authority” to make all fundamental deci-
sions such as whether or not to plead guilty, testify, or waive a jury
trial,108 the Comments to Model Rule 1.2 suggest that defense
counsel is charged with making tactical or strategic decisions. Cru-
cially, however, “concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected” is assigned to the client.109 Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 2.1 provides: “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
103 See Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G
REP. 126, 126 (2012) (“[I]f a prosecutor makes an offer that is too good to refuse, the
defense attorney must not only inform the defendant of the offer but perhaps also
take steps to persuade the defendant to accept.”). See also Steven Zeidman, To Plead or
Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841,
852–53 (1998), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar
ticle=2103&context=bclr.
104 See generally Zeidman, supra note 103 (giving an overview of what defense coun-
sel must and may do with regards to informing clients of plea offers and the conse-
quences of taking them).
105 See id. at 847–48; see also id. at 908 (“Although posited as a response to lawyers’
paternalistically telling their clients what to do, neutrality, premised on notions that
clients will be unable to make independent judgments once their lawyer advises a
particular choice, treats clients as inherently incapable of listening to advice, weighing
it and reaching an autonomous decision. In order to free clients from attorney influ-
ence, counsel withholds information—her opinion—which might be important for
the client to evaluate in order to make a fully informed decision.”).
106 Id. at 900.
107 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES
§ 201, at 339 (5th ed. 1988) (“The limits of allowable persuasion are fixed by the
lawyer’s conscience.”).
108 Zeidman, supra note 103, at 853 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983)).
109 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2011).
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social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situa-
tion.” Model Code EC 7-9 provides that, while a lawyer should al-
ways act consistent with the best interests of her client, “when an
action in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust,
he may ask his client for permission to forego such action.” How-
ever, Model Code EC 7-8 provides that “the decision whether to
forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal
factors is ultimately for the client and not for the lawyer.” And
Model Rule 1.16(b)(4) states that a lawyer has discretion to with-
draw from representation if “the client insists upon taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.”
A new ethical rule was considered by the ABA as a revision to
Model Rule 8.4, the rule defining attorney misconduct, in the
1990s; the rule would have prohibited the use of bias-based de-
fenses, but it was not adopted.110 Massachusetts did enact ethical
rules that comported with the proposed revision to the Model
Rule, but they were limited by qualifying language that specified
the rules do not “preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, na-
tional origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, or another simi-
lar factor is an issue in the proceeding.”111
The following debate illustrates two views about what defense
counsel should do when she disagrees with her client about a par-
ticular defense tactic or strategy based on the potential harm or
benefit to the individual or the community.
C. Zealous Advocacy v. Anti-subordination
Defense strategies may be extremely controversial, potentially
invoking negative stereotypes about a marginalized community for
the good of the individual person accused. For example, the “gay
panic” defense draws on provocation and “heat of passion” de-
fenses to mitigate the culpability of an individual who reacts (“un-
derstandably”) violently to the sexual advances of a person of the
same sex; it does this by legitimizing straight male fear and abhor-
rence of gay male sexuality, with the end goal being a reduced
110 See, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Reliance on Bias and Prejudice,
8 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 24 (1994). The rejected rule provided that “[i]t is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . manifest by words or conduct, in the course of
representing a client, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socio-economic status. This paragraph does not pre-
clude legitimate advocacy with respect to the foregoing factors.” Id. (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 24 n.98.
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charge (usually from murder to manslaughter).112 Based on the
same reasoning, “transgender panic” has been used in cases of as-
sault or murder of trans individuals, most notably in the case of
Gwen Araujo.113 This genre of defense has been successful with ju-
ries, in that defendants’ convictions have been reduced from mur-
der to manslaughter; however, the defense was disallowed in the
famous Matthew Shepard case and has been roundly criticized for
legitimizing homophobia and pandering to jury bias.114 Note as
well that the controversial and movement-damaging defense was
disallowed in the case of a white, gay, cisgender man, while it was
allowed in the case of a transgender Latina woman—racism and
classism are clearly at play in all parts of the criminal system, in-
cluding defense strategies. To frame the debates that follow, the
question of the ultimate effect on society of such defenses is key.
Those who oppose their use ultimately argue that defenses like
“gay and trans panic” signal to people that violent attacks on trans
and queer people are excusable.115
The two schools of thought discussed below differ in how they
approach the use of race, culture, gender, and sexuality by defense
attorneys. Prof. Muneer Ahmad tackles the debate by posing the
question whether “the ethical rules permit, or even require, lawyers
to strategically deploy racist, sexist or homophobic narratives that
will advance their clients’ interests?”116 These approaches contextu-
alize the “tension that arises between the progressive [defense] law-
yer’s political commitment to anti-subordination on the one hand,
112 See Teresa Marie Garmon, The Panic Defense and Model Rules Common Sense: A
Practical Solution for A Twenty-First Century Ethical Dilemma, 45 GA. L. REV. 621, 633
(2011); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 489 (2008).
113 Victoria L. Steinberg, A Heat of Passion Offense: Emotions and Bias in “Transgender
Panic” Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 499, 501 (2005). See also Jillian T.
Weiss, Banning the “Trans Panic Defense,” BILERICO PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2008, 7:00 PM),
http://www.bilerico.com/2008/09/banning_the_trans_panic_defense.php.
114 Garmon, supra note 112, at 635.
115 Though beyond the scope of this Note, a related concept is the current debate
on hate crimes legislation, which was created to signal moral indignation for bias-
based violence by imposing harsher penalties (i.e., more time locked up in prison) for
those alleged to have committed hate crimes. Several queer and trans organizations,
however, have come out against hate crimes legislation, arguing that increasing puni-
tive responses to homophobia only serves to structurally reinforce violence by promot-
ing incarceration and the violence of the prison industrial complex. For a broad
overview of this topic, see Che Gossett, Reina Gossett & AJ Lewis, Reclaiming Our Line-
age: Organized Queer, Gender-Nonconforming, and Transgender Resistance to Police Violence,
THE SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE (2011), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-
agenda/reclaiming-our-lineage-organized-queer-gender-nonconforming-and-trans-
gender-resistance-to-police-violence/0/.
116 Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
117, 117 (2002).
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and the particular demands of an individual client’s case on the
other,” including the client’s constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.117
i. Zealous Advocacy and Public Defenders
The philosophy of zealous representation was famously articu-
lated by Lord Brougham in 1821:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one per-
son in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the
alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others.118
Abbe Smith, a prominent legal scholar and former public de-
fender who has written extensively on the topic, agrees that zealous
advocacy is an imperative, especially for public defenders.119 Smith
explicitly defends the use of stereotypes to paint a certain picture
of the defendant or complaining witness or to poke holes in the
government’s theory, if this will advance her clients’ interests:
“[d]efense lawyers cannot afford to be color-blind, gender-blind,
or even slightly near-sighted when it comes to race, gender, sexual
orientation, and ethnicity, because jurors will be paying close atten-
tion and they have come to the trial with their own feelings about
these issues.”120 Smith defended the use of male pronouns when
117 See id.
118 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (London, J. Robins & Co. Albion Press 1820–21).
119 See Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11
WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 135–36 (2003) (“[A]dversarial zeal is most important when
the stakes are high, the adversary powerful, and the level of trust between the lawyer
and client low. The only way to compensate for the disadvantage in resources and
power is to allow a more fiercely adversarial ethic on behalf of intimidated and iso-
lated clients who lack the means to hire their own attorneys. Only through zealous
advocacy can there be meaningful access to justice.”). Importantly, while Smith prem-
ises her ethics on the fact that zealous advocacy is imperative in an adversarial system,
many dispute that the criminal system is in fact adversarial. See Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and
Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25 (2012), http://yalelaw
journal.org/2012/06/18/rakoff.html (noting that 97% of federal criminal convic-
tions and 94% of state criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas, a coopera-
tion between defense and prosecuting attorneys that do not force the prosecution to
its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which in turn leads many innocent
people to plead guilty).
120 Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People
Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 954–55 (2000). See also Abbe Smith,
Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist
Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 480 (1995) [hereinafter
Smith, Criminal Responsibility] (“Like many criminal defense lawyers . . . I often raise a
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cross-examining a transgender woman complaining witness, and
endorsed pointing out her birth-assigned sex (male) despite the
fact that she explicitly identified as a woman, where defense coun-
sel represented a cisgender male accused of assaulting her.121 Per-
suasion, she claims, is the defender’s main tool, and persuasion
often involves “playing on the sympathies and prejudices of an au-
dience . . . you get them to identify with the position you’re advanc-
ing, or at least identify less with your opponent’s position.”122
Another supporter of this view states that zealous advocacy is a
moral responsibility, making it necessary for the defense attorney
to “separate her individual beliefs and morals from those of her
client. . . . The means used and the end attained are not reflective
of the lawyer’s principles.”123
In an interesting career twist, however, Smith was contacted to
represent crime victim Claudia Brenner, after she and her partner
were shot at in the woods—Brenner was wounded and her partner
was killed.124 The defendant used the gay panic defense, claiming
that after watching the women have sex in the woods he was pro-
voked into shooting them because he had suffered abuse as a child,
had been sexually assaulted by men in prison, experienced fre-
quent rejection by women, and because his mother was a les-
bian.125 While maintaining that she did not find fault with the
defense attorney’s ethical choices, Smith admitted to feeling good
about being on the “right side” in that case.126 She cites another
case in which she represented a person who was abused by police
and falsely accused of assault once it was discovered the person was
trans: “Representing this client was entirely consistent with much
of what motivates me to be a criminal defender: I was defending a
kind of cultural defense, if the facts allow. I’m likely to suggest that my client’s intent
was seduction, not rape, and that his ungentlemanly method was the product of ma-
chismo and bravado, not a criminal state of mind. . . . Perhaps I am exploiting cul-
tural stereotypes, as opposed to raising a formal cultural defense, but I’m not sure the
two are so different. The cultural defenses raised on behalf of newly arrived immi-
grants and accused rapists sound alike: my client did not intend to commit a crime;
he thought he was doing what was expected of him in his cultural milieu; my client
didn’t do it, the male culture did.”).
121 Abbe Smith, The Complex Uses of Sexual Orientation in Criminal Court, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 101, 110 (2002) (“Though this may have been unseemly, it
was an entirely appropriate defense strategy.”).
122 Id. at 115.
123 Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL
L. REV. 147, 210 (2000).
124 Smith, supra note 121, at 111.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 112–13.
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marginalized member of a social minority (who also happened to
be poor and black) who was a victim of ill treatment at the hands of
the police.”127 She then claims that criminal defense attorneys
should follow trends of social justice, not set them, exploiting ste-
reotypes as long as they exist:
[A]s our society becomes more enlightened and accepting, so
will criminal practice. There are some who believe that law-
yers—and especially criminal trial lawyers, who are sometimes in
the public light—ought to lead the way to this new day. I do not
think so. I think we ask enough already of those who defend the
least popular and least powerful among us.128
David Luban, a critic of the absolute imperative of zealous rep-
resentation, has theorized about a model of legal advocacy which
centralizes human dignity and the interactions between attorneys
and those they serve, not merely a series of judicial adjudica-
tions.129 He claims that the professional ideal of “moral activism . . .
imposes on lawyers the moral responsibility to ‘break role’ in com-
pelling moral circumstances to respond to the human pathos of
those on whom harm would be visited as a result of adhering to
professional role obligations.”130 He has admitted, however, that
his theory applies most strongly to civil legal advocacy, where the
parties to the dispute are arguably more equal in terms of power
and control; criminal defenders are different—those accused of
crimes, particularly low-income people assigned public defenders,
face the power of the state with their liberty at stake.131 Another
scholar finds that, while considerations of negative stereotypes and
detrimental community effect should be talked about between the
attorney and client, the ultimate decision of whether or not to util-
ize such stereotypes as part of an advantageous criminal defense
are ultimately up to the client; the lawyer’s feelings about it should
not preclude such a defense.132
The zealous advocacy approach has been criticized for its dis-
regard for the “truth” and its willingness to rely on potentially neg-
127 Id. at 113.
128 Id. at 114 (“The criminal lawyer routinely stands between his or her client and
the purgatory we call criminal punishment. This is an honorable vocation and one
that is essential to our adversarial system of justice.”).
129 See Katherine R. Kruse, The Human Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1343,
1343–48 (2008).
130 Id. at 1348.
131 See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1756–58
(1993).
132 Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham’s Bromide: Good Lawyers As Bad Citizens, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 119, 122 (1996).
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ative stereotypical narratives—often about race, culture, gender,
and sexuality—so long as those stereotypes advance their clients’
interests.133 It is true that defense attorneys put forth to the judge
or jury their client’s side of a story—in gay and trans panic cases,
defense attorneys are merely relating the very real prejudice their
client experienced, and which they claim led to their actions. It is
certainly not the attorney’s fault if the person accused suffered
from bias. However, as Smith alluded, a savvy defender will not rely
on a prejudicial stereotype which is not commonly held. The issue
is whether the defense attorney must wait for negative stereotypes
to fall out of favor before ceasing to exploit them in the
courtroom.
ii. Dignitary and Anti-humiliation Postures—Ivory Tower
Luxury?
Scholar Anthony Alfieri takes issue with the use of narratives,
constructed either by defense attorney or client, that uphold domi-
nant beliefs and assumptions which perpetuate racist stereotypes in
cases involving crimes of violence committed by people of color
against whites.134 The fact that such narratives, which play on the
prejudices of the audience and damaging stereotypes, are very per-
suasive (and thus effective for the defendants who use them) is the
main reason not to employ them. Critical race theorist Richard
Delgado stated that Alfieri’s critical “attention to the narrative side
of lawyering can enable lawyers representing the poor and disen-
franchised to achieve a better brand of justice.”135 Alfieri agrees
with Luban’s model as applied to preserving the human dignity of
criminal defendants of color and their communities, but rejects
the idea that criminal defense is different.136
Smith openly criticized Alfieri for suggesting that defense at-
torneys should sacrifice their clients’ liberty for the good of the
broader community.137 To follow Alfieri’s reasoning would be to
“completely transform criminal defense lawyers from defenders of
133 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1345–49 (1998) (“For
defense lawyers, truth is undiscoverable and, moreover, immaterial. Crudely
postmodern, they claim a situated truth linked only to standpoint—the standpoint of
judge and jury.” Id. at 1345.).
134 See id. at 1345–50.
135 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
51 (2d ed. 2012).
136 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1651, 1656–59 (2009).
137 See Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: “Race-Conscious” Ethics in Criminal De-
fense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1589–90 (1999).
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individuals accused of crime, a difficult enough enterprise, to pro-
tectors of the community.”138 She ultimately boils it down to this
stark prediction: “In practice, Alfieri’s communitarianism would
serve to expedite the prosecution and incarceration of the most
marginalized.”139 Another scholar finds that Alfieri’s thesis “openly
restricts defense lawyers [in interracial violence cases] to certain
legal arguments, regardless of their value or proximity to ‘objec-
tive’ truth.”140
Alfieri writes primarily about high-profile interracial violence
cases in which African-American men are charged with some form
of violent assault against a white person. Smith recognized that
high-profile cases involving media coverage may indeed mean the
defense attorney should abandon strategies she might otherwise
employ if such strategies would hurt the defendant’s commu-
nity.141 Ahmad, by contrast, does not distinguish between high-pro-
file and “smaller” cases in his assertion that negative stereotypes
should not be used in defense tactics:
[A]s individual, as particularized, and as client-centered as a rep-
resentation may be, it does not occur in a vacuum . . . just as the
[defenders’] efforts in an individual representation will not
eradicate racism, sexism, or homophobia, nor will a client’s indi-
vidual case, by itself, resolve the systemic oppression of poor
people by the criminal justice system. Both efforts depend upon
our aggregate efforts, and rely upon the notion that our individ-
ual actions, no matter how small, are of consequence. They mat-
ter. They are subject to moral scrutiny. Even in the smallest of
cases, we are as lawyers creatures in an ecosystem that shifts and
responds as we do.142
138 Id. at 1590.
139 Id. at 1590 n.34.
140 Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road
Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788, 792 (1996).
141 Smith, supra note 137, at 1596.
142 Ahmad, supra note 116, at 126. Ahmad continues:
Assume that use of the term “Muslim fundamentalist” will find favor
with the judge and that it will be to the client’s advantage. . . . It is, in my
mind, not a stretch at all to think that an immigration judge’s subscrip-
tion to the broad application of the term “Muslim fundamentalist”
might affect her judgment on whether to permit [another Arab or Mus-
lim] immigrant’s detention. We must be honest in our recognition of
the lawyer’s role and responsibility in shaping this judge’s judgment,
and how it might affect others in the future.
The lawyer-client relationship may be a confidential one, but it is not
wholly a private one. We can learn from queer theory the value of trans-
parency, of understanding that the acts of individuals are of conse-
quence to the collective. Is there a tension between zeal to the
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Ahmad (then a criminal defense clinic professor) ultimately con-
cluded that lawyers should “engage their clients in a meaningful
discussion of the potential negative consequences to others of their
specific narrative choices.”143 Another defense clinic professor
agreed with this approach, and wrote about her experience super-
vising student-attorneys who spoke with their clients about the neg-
ative biases that would likely be fueled by defenses they had
contemplated, which led the clients to ultimately choose “a fair
fight with family members [complaining witnesses] for whom they
held complex feelings.”144
The next section will compare controversial defense strategies
that rely on characteristics of the accused and appeal to bias in an
attempt to mitigate culpability or obtain a reduced sentence. It will
analyze both the justifications and the criticism of these strategies
in an attempt to decipher the wisdom of Coombs’ GID defense.
IV. DON’T CRIMINALIZE—PATHOLOGIZE!
The following controversial storytelling tactics—insanity, bat-
tered women’s syndrome, rotten social background, and cultural
defenses—are used by defenders to present mitigating evidence of
personal or cultural characteristics of people accused to show they
did not have the mental culpability required by the offense
charged.145 These theories have been criticized as exploitative and
reductionist, as racist, anti-feminist, and homophobic. Alternately,
they are criticized for letting people off the hook who don’t truly
“deserve” it—the genre has been referred to disparagingly as
“abuse excuse.”146 Those who defend these strategies argue that
they can humanize defendants and educate judges and juries about
the tragedies that occur at the intersections of crime, culture, race,
poverty, gender, and mental illness. More importantly, they can
produce positive results for people accused of crimes by keeping
individual client and commitment to anti-subordination? Of course
there is. But our fidelity to ourselves as lawyers depends upon the hon-
est embrace of such tension as a threshold step to its resolution.
Id. at 126–27.
143 Id. at 125. See also Nilsen, supra note 110, at 23 n.92.
144 Nilsen, supra note 110, at 23 n.92.
145 These tactics are not directly related to Manning’s case because they deal with
racism and communities of color; however, they analogously address the use of nega-
tive stereotypes as a criminal defense.
146 See J. Thomas Parker, The Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-Outs, Sob Stories, and Evasions
of Responsibility, 150 MIL. L. REV. 410 (1995) (book review) (quoting from book by
Alan M. Dershowitz defining “abuse excuses” as “legal tactic[s] by which criminal de-
fendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation”).
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them from being locked up, overturning convictions, or reducing
time spent incarcerated. Crucially, they are employed in the face of
much more abusive tactics by judges and prosecutors, whose dis-
criminatory attitudes fuel the majority of the racist, classist, and
homophobic discourse and behavior in criminal courtrooms. It is
important to note that the defenses are not frequently used, and
when used they are not often successful—they are often a gamble
taken as a last resort.
A. Insanity Defense—Psychological Evidence
The longest-standing, and perhaps most infamous, of the nar-
rative defense strategies is the insanity defense. Insanity is a legal
term of art, and is not synonymous with mental illness as defined
by the APA or the DSM.147 The test for insanity is notoriously diffi-
cult to conform to148 and is also highly politicized, having under-
gone scathing criticism.149 When used successfully, the defense
may result in acquittal by reason of insanity, a reduced sentence in
capital cases, or the accused being declared incompetent to stand
trial altogether.150
The analogous defense in the military context is lack of
mental responsibility.151 Coombs leaned heavily towards this de-
fense at the Article 32 hearing by focusing on the mental instability
he associated with Manning’s gender identity. GID symptoms
could never approach the level of psychological incapacity re-
quired for an insanity defense, but Coombs did not attempt to take
the strategy that far. Instead he presented a series of inferences:
Manning had GID; therefore, she suffered from emotional distress
which is severe enough to be listed as a psychiatric disorder in the
DSM; it followed that she had a diminished capacity to either rec-
147 DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 348–49.
148 Id. at 365.
149 Id. at 339 (explaining that the defense was highly criticized when used in John
Hinckley’s defense after his attempt to shoot President Reagan). See also Christopher
Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test as a Replacement for the Special Defense of In-
sanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523 (2009); Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on
the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public
Health, Ethical, and Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piece-
meal Change, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 72 (2005).
150 LEE & HARRIS, supra note 95, at 697–98.
151 MASON, supra note 25, at Summary Page. Before the Article 32 hearing, a Rule
for Court-Martial (RCM) 706 board examination, comprised of military medical per-
sonnel, was held to determine whether Manning was fit to stand trial; Manning was
found fit in April 2011. See Michelle Lindo McCluer, RCM 706 Board Finds Manning Fit
to Stand Trial, NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUST. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011, 4:42 PM), http://
www.nimjblog.org/2011/04/rcm-706-board-finds-manning-fit-to.html.
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ognize the nature of wrong and right or conform her behavior to
fit the law; and thus, she should not be punished because she did
not intend to act as she did, and the Aiding the Enemy statute re-
quires intent.
B. Rotten Social Background—Sociological Evidence
Rotten Social Background (RSB) is a defense strategy that
seeks to introduce evidence of severe environmental and economic
deprivation to show the accused lacked mental and moral culpabil-
ity and therefore should not be punished.152 Critical race theorist
Richard Delgado posited that “[a]n environment of extreme pov-
erty and deprivation creates in individuals a propensity to commit
crimes.”153 Ultimately, Delgado argued that an RSB defendant
should not be punished for transgressing the rules of a culture that
actively marginalizes and abuses him.154 This defense has not been
successfully used to mitigate culpability on the merits; however,
RSB evidence is often considered in sentencing, especially in capi-
tal cases.155
The sociological RSB factors are analogous to those on which
Coombs based the GID defense. As opposed to arguing that the
accused lacks all mental capacity, RSB allows defense attorneys to
focus on the environmental aspects of crime and mental disorder.
Poverty, homelessness, health issues, and environmental depriva-
tion are realities for many transgender folks, especially trans peo-
ple of color. Manning, like other trans people, had a history of
152 This evidence includes, but is not limited to, lack of emotional support within
the family, squalid living conditions, alcoholism, abuse, and marginalization from
middle-class society. This concept was first articulated by Judge David Bazelon in his
dissent in United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Alexander, a
divided circuit court affirmed, inter alia, a jury instruction to disregard a psychiatrist’s
testimony that the defendant’s impoverished upbringing—replete with traumatic in-
cidents of racism and minimal emotional support from his family—caused him to
experience an “irresistible impulse to shoot” when he was verbally assaulted by a racist
marine. Id. at 957–59 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Bazelon later explored how people
from economically disadvantaged backgrounds could utilize a defense predicated on
“disease” models like insanity to mitigate their culpability. See David Bazelon, The Mo-
rality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); David Bazelon, The Crime
Controversy: Avoiding Realities, 35 VAND. L. REV. 487, 489–92 (1982).
153 Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 54 (1985).
154 See id. at 68–75.
155 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (stating that a capital defen-
dant had a constitutional right at sentencing to present evidence of “nightmarish
childhood” and borderline mental retardation); see also Mythri A. Jayaraman, Note,
Rotten Social Background Revisited, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 327 (2002), available at http://scholar
lycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol14/iss2/6/.
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social isolation and ostracization at school and home, so she argua-
bly is not bound by the social contract in the same way as are others
in our society who are better cared for. However, RSB, as Delgado
envisioned it, applies more to people of color growing up in low-
income urban environments.
C. Battered Woman Syndrome—Relational Evidence
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS), a subcategory of Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder in the DSM, refers to “psychological changes
that occur after exposure to repeated abuse”156 and is used to sup-
port a justification defense for women who kill or attempt to kill
their abusive partners. BWS has been successfully used to support
claims of self-defense in situations such as where the abusive part-
ner was asleep.157 By utilizing trauma theory, BWS focuses on evi-
dence such as “oppression, powerlessness . . . [and] learned
helplessness” to explain the psychological impact of abuse and ar-
gue that some women are justified in killing their abusers.158
BWS has been criticized by many,159 including critical race
feminists who argue that it creates a caricature of women as help-
less victims with no personal agency,160 a dangerous over-simplifica-
tion that has had a damaging effect on all women, particularly
women of color who have historically had vastly different exper-
iences of patriarchy than the white women on whom the defini-
tions of oppression embedded in BWS are based.161 This applies
with force to Manning’s GID defense. Fitting oneself into oppres-
sive or unattainable categories can be imperative for a BWS defen-
dant, whereas GID pathologizes individuals who don’t fit coercive
and stifling gender norms. Many see this as victim-blaming, and as
a cop-out instead of fighting to change the dominant culture. This
was briefly acknowledged by Coombs in his Article 32 closing argu-
156 Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 326 (1992).
157 Id. at 321. See also DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 223–25.
158 Walker, supra note 156, at 326–37.
159 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a
Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 33–36 (2011); Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in
Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is Political,” and the Criminal Justice System,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 1255 (2010); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women
and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 458 (1991).
160 Smith, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 120, at 468–69.
161 See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223,
1249 (2001); Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Femi-
nist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 191–92 (1991).
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ment, where he lamented the “disorder” label while proceeding to
use it anyway.
D. Cultural Defense—Anthropological Evidence
Other defenses use “cultural evidence by immigrant and/or
racial minority defendants seeking to refute or mitigate criminal
charges.”162 The evidence is used to show that the person accused
should not be punished (or should be punished less severely) for
conforming to his or her own cultural norms.163 While a distinct
defense does not exist, cultural evidence has successfully been ad-
mitted as mitigating evidence in a very few cases, resulting in con-
victions for lower charges and even some being overturned.164
The use of cultural evidence is controversial; Professor Leti
Volpp has pointed out that “[c]ulture is not some monolithic,
fixed, and static essence.”165 Problems of essentializing cultures
and “othering” occur, and Volpp noted that there is a “general fail-
ure to look at the behavior of white persons as cultural, while al-
ways ascribing the label of culture to the behavior of minority
groups.”166 Some feminists oppose the use of culture evidence to
mitigate culpability in cases involving violence against women, ar-
guing that the defense condones such violence.167 Those who sup-
port the use of this tactic claim that culturally “othered”
defendants are already disadvantaged in court, and cultural evi-
dence can create much-needed context for the accused’s actions,
thereby humanizing her in a vital way for the judge and jury.168
162 Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural De-
fense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 915 (2007).
163 Id. at 915–16. See also Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cul-
tural Preemption: A Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 102–03, 115 (1997).
164 See generally Kim, supra note 163. See also Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and
Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal
Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 37 (1995); Lee, supra note 162, at 920.
165 Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multicultural-
ism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1589 (1996); id. at 1592.
166 Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1189
(2001).
167 See Kim, supra note 163, at 110–11; Maguigan, supra note 164, at 44.
168 Maguigan, supra note 164, at 58–59. But cf. Lee, supra note 162, at 940–41.
(“Judges, jurors, and prosecutors attempting to be culturally sensitive often end up
reinforcing negative stereotypes about the racial or ethnic group of the defendant.”
Id. at 941.).
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V. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER DEFENDANTS
IN COURT—CAN A GID-TYPE DEFENSE
EVER BE USED SAFELY?
The courtroom is no exception to the discrimination trans-
gender people face daily—trans defendants are usually not called
by their correct names and incorrect pronouns are used,169 and
they have been portrayed as deceitful,170 diseased,171 or degraded
and debauched.172 So-called deviant sexuality and gender expres-
sion are presumptively criminal, as evidenced by lewd conduct stat-
utes (enforced disproportionately against queer and transgender
individuals) and frequent arrests for “walking while trans” where
police target transgender women walking, especially at night, and
profile them as performing sex work.173 Once in the courtroom,
trans defendants are often treated terribly by court staff, judges,
prosecutors, and their own attorneys.174
Is it possible, then, for a defense attorney to use GID safely, in
a way that helps her client, when the courtroom is teeming with
institutional and particularized homo- and transphobia? Using GID
in a criminal case is a gamble: it could potentially garner sympathy
or vitriol. One capital case that reached the Supreme Court175 illus-
trates an example of the defense going well, while many others
demonstrate the defense going very badly.176
169 See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS & TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., SOME COURT-
ROOM CONCERNS OF THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/
resources/courtroomconcerns.pdf.
170 See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 81, at 30, 35–36, 73, 76–77 (referring to trans-
gendered individuals as “tricking” those around them, and the jurors, into thinking
they are normatively gendered).
171 See id. at 30, 43 (giving examples and noting portrayals of transgender people as
psychologically and emotionally unstable, neurotic, and compulsive).
172 See id. at 31–34 (noting archetypal characterizations of transgender people as
pedophiles, sexually depraved, and incapable of controlling their perverse sexual
impulses).
173 See id. at 59–61. See also Smith, supra note 121, at 103 (“[T]he vast majority of
openly gay or transgendered people who wind up in criminal court are charged with
solicitation or prostitution.”).
174 Id. at 72–75.
175 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require consid-
eration of mitigating evidence to justify the death penalty. Id. at 604. Therefore, in
death penalty cases, a court could decide to consider evidence relating to sexuality or
gender identity if it was found to have mitigated culpability in some way (i.e. caused
emotional distress, required therapy, caused the accused to be disowned). See id.
176 The cases below examine defendants who identified (or were identified) as
transgender, gender-nonconforming, and/or gay. These distinct categories are
lumped together for two reasons: first, people are often identified by others as gay
based on their gender expression, regardless of these individuals’ actual sexual orien-
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A. The “Good”—Leslie Ann Nelson
A complicated, tragic, and ultimately somewhat successful ex-
ample of the use of GID as a mitigating factor in the death penalty
context was the case of Leslie Ann Nelson, who pleaded guilty to
killing two police officers and to second-degree aggravated assault
of a third officer and was sentenced to death.177 During the penalty
trial, the defense relied heavily on GID and (allegedly) attendant
mental illness as mitigating evidence to avoid the death penalty, to
no avail.178 Nelson was sentenced to death, but the New Jersey Su-
preme Court vacated the death sentence based on a Brady viola-
tion.179 A new penalty trial was held but a majority of jurors found
that the aggravating factors outweighed Nelson’s long history of
psychological issues.180 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court
once again overturned the death penalty, finding that the instruc-
tions to the jury regarding balancing aggravating and mitigating
factors were misleading.181 In this opinion, the court reviewed the
extensive psychological and social history put forth by mental
health experts at trial, including detailed stories about Ms. Nel-
son’s ostracization based on her gender, the violence she exper-
ienced, as well as depression, anxiety, and transition.182
The court found that the jury did not properly consider Ms.
Nelson’s psychological and emotional history, and reversed the
death penalty and ordered a third penalty trial.183 Ms. Nelson was
transported off death row, where she had been the only woman
inmate, and was transferred to a women’s correctional facility
where she received an “Inmate of the Month” award for helping
other women in the law library.184 The New Jersey Supreme Court
re-abolished the death penalty in 2007 before Ms. Nelson’s third
tation (i.e. “feminine” men are presumed gay and “masculine” women presumed les-
bians); second, gay people who are also gender-nonconforming face additional
stigma and are often treated worse than more gender-conforming folks.
177 See State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 429–32 (2002).
178 See State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 511 (1998).
179 Nelson, 173 N.J. at 432–33.
180 Id. at 433–34.
181 Id. at 446, 459–60.
182 See id. at 434–40.
183 See Laura Mansnerus, Briefing: The Courts; Death Sentence Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/04/nyregion/briefing-the-courts-
death-sentence-reprieve.html; Laura Mansnerus, Top Court Again Rejects Sentence of
Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/nyregion/
top-court-again-rejects-sentence-of-death.html.
184 See Double Cop Killer Honored as ‘Inmate of the Month,’ NJLAWMAN.COM (Oct. 30,
2005, 11:56 PM), http://www.njlawman.com/Editorials/Inmate-of-the-Month.htm.
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trial took place.185 While evidence about Ms. Nelson’s gender iden-
tity was cited as contributing to commuting her sentence, it can
easily be argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reluctance to
kill Leslie Ann Nelson had less to do with its concern for a trans-
gender woman with a history of abuse, trauma, and depression,
and more with its growing inclination to abolish the death penalty
entirely.
B. The “Bad”—The “Deviant” Archetype
A much more significant number of cases suggest that being
openly or visibly gay, queer, or transgender in criminal court
makes it more likely that a person will receive a harsher sentence.
One example is the case of Calvin Burdine, a white gay man con-
victed of capital murder in a trial that lasted less than thirteen
hours.186 The most notorious aspect of the case was the
homophobia Burdine suffered at the hands of every institutional
actor in the courtroom, including his defense attorney who failed
to object to multiple homophobic comments by the prosecutor,
the most of egregious of which was in his closing statement to the
jury: “[s]ending a homosexual to the penitentiary certainly isn’t a
very bad punishment for a homosexual, and that’s what he’s asking
you to do.”187
Another example involved an African-American lesbian,
Wanda Jean Allen, who was convicted of murdering her partner
and sentenced to death.188 At trial, the prosecutor informed the
jury that Allen “wore the pants” and was “the man” in the family; he
called the deceased’s mother in to testify that Allen spelled her
185 See Keith B. Richburg, N.J. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to Sign,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti
cle/2007/12/13/AR2007121301302.html.
186 See Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Burdine was
convicted of killing his ex-lover after attempting to get money from him and stealing
his ATM card); Michael B. Shortnacy, Guilty and Gay, a Recipe for Execution in American
Courtrooms: Sexual Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases,
51 AM. U. L. REV. 309, 347 (2001); Richard Goldstein, Queer on Death Row, VILLAGE
VOICE (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.villagevoice.com/2001-03-13/news/queer-on-
death-row/.
187 Shortnacy, supra note 186, at 347. Burdine applied for habeas corpus relief and
listed ten issues in his application, including the prosecutor’s homophobic remarks;
but the district court never reached that point—it granted habeas relief on the
ground that Burdine’s attorney had slept through “substantial portions” of the trial.
Id. at 348–49.
188 See LaDonna Childress, To Fulfill a Promise: Using Canons 3B(5) and 3B(6) of the
Judicial Code of Conduct to Combat Sexual Orientation Bias Against Gay and Lesbian Crimi-
nal Defendants, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 607, 609 (2005).
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middle “G-E-N-E,” not the feminine version “J-E-A-N.”189 The ap-
peals court approved the use of this evidence, saying it helped the
jury to understand the relationship of the parties, and was evidence
of Allen’s aggressive nature.190 The district court, in considering
her habeas petition, found that even if the statements by the prose-
cutor were improper, they did not unduly influence the jury’s deci-
sion or lead to an unfair trial. Allen was executed by the state of
Oklahoma in 2001.191
In another case, a Latina lesbian, Bernina Mata, was charged
with and convicted of murdering a man she had met that night at a
bar.192 Mata claimed she acted in self-defense, but the prosecutor
proffered evidence that “she was a ‘hard core’ lesbian, and that a
lesbian was more likely to kill a man who made an unwanted pass
at her than a heterosexual woman.”193 He further stated that “[a]
normal heterosexual woman would not be so offended by such
conduct as to murder.”194 The state brought ten witnesses to testify
that Mata was a lesbian to support its theory.195 Mata was convicted
and sentenced to death, but her sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment in 2003.
Finally, in a case where New York police officers were accused
of physically and sexually assaulting a Haitian immigrant, the de-
fense counsel for one officer claimed in his opening that the inter-
nal injuries the victim suffered were actually the result of
consensual same-sex anal sex, not police brutality.196 Critics of the
defense spanned from LGBT activists who claimed the defense per-
petuated a stereotype about rough or violent gay sex, to critics such
as the Rev. Al Sharpton who considered calling the accused gay to
be slander and character assassination.197
C. The “Different”
Criminal defendants are undoubtedly discriminated against
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity, and also
based on their race and class. It is recognized by many that death
189 Id.
190 Shortnacy, supra note 186, at 343–44 (noting that the altercation occurred after
a dispute between the two over the deceased’s welfare check).
191 Id. at 344.
192 Joey L. Mogul, The Dykier, the Butcher, the Better: The State’s Use of Homophobia and
Sexism to Execute Women in the United States, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 473, 484 (2005).
193 Id. at 485.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Smith, supra note 121, at 107.
197 Id. at 107–08.
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penalty sentencing depends on the dehumanization of the defen-
dant; therefore, it is easier for jurors to execute a person of a differ-
ent race, class, sexual orientation, or gender identity/expression as
themselves.198 The mainstream, white LGBT community, too, tends
to distance itself from its members when they are accused of
crimes, while rallying publicly around victims of crimes (especially
gay white victims). As noted above, Manning has not been hailed as
a trans hero. As Abbe Smith puts it, “[b]eing a convicted murderer
seems to eclipse one’s membership in the gay community.”199
In some ways, then, Manning was in a better position for
Coombs to have used a controversial defense that, if Manning were
a person of color or visibly gender-nonconforming, would likely
not have been effective. As a young, white, apparently gender-con-
forming person in a military uniform, the prosecution (a team of
white JAG attorneys, with the lead prosecutor being a white man)
and the judge (a white woman) could look at her and relate in
some ways. However, Coombs’ use of a GID-diminished capacity
defense in a military environment, known for enforcing homoge-
neity through regulations and violence, and for being institution-
ally transphobic, made the strategy look less than wise.
CONCLUSION
The ethical issues surrounding the use of negative stereotypi-
cal narratives as strategic mitigating factors in criminal defense
cases remain complex and disputed. In Pfc. Chelsea Manning’s
case, Coombs called attention to Manning’s emotional distress and
attributed it to her gender identity, even though that was likely
only one aspect of the distress. As there is no whistleblower disor-
der, GID was a diagnosable cause for Manning’s emotional distur-
bance. And Coombs used that argument despite perhaps having
never talked to another transgender person in his life. However, a
savvy defense attorney will always consider the mental health of
those she represents. If a person is mentally ill, a defense attorney
will likely call attention to that mental illness to show that the per-
son accused was not acting voluntarily, or lacked the requisite in-
tent. Here, the “mental illness” at issue was a highly contested
diagnosis that pathologized an oppressed group of people.
The crux of Coombs’s early argument for using GID as a miti-
gating factor appears to be a commitment to zealous representa-
198 Mogul, supra note 192, at 478.
199 Smith, supra note 121, at 106.
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tion.200 However, Coombs made no effort to reach out to trans
activists or organizations about his strategies. Further, he has not
fully acknowledged how controversial the tactic was, nor has he is-
sued any statements about homophobia and transphobia in the
military and how this could affect judgment against Manning.201
Despite this, Coombs was not ethically obliged to forgo the de-
fense, or to consult with community groups before doing so. How-
ever, the maelstrom around the defense could have been tempered
by a public statement similar to the one made during the closing
arguments at the Article 32 hearing, acknowledging that GID is not
a disorder but that Manning nonetheless experienced emotional
distress about her gender identity in the oppressive environment of
the military. Such a statement would not likely have quelled all crit-
icism, but it would have at least informed the public that Coombs
had done some basic research on trans-related issues, without giv-
ing away any crucial information about his defense theory.202
Coombs was ethically obliged to argue zealously for Manning,
and to use any defense he believed would help Manning avoid
spending the rest of her life locked up in a cage. My endorsement
of the defense strategy as ethically sound is contingent, however,
200 Coombs said as much in his first public comments, delivered in December 2012:
[I]t was and still is my belief that Bradley Manning deserves an attorney
that is focused on what is happening in the courtroom and only what is
happening in the courtroom . . . . [The record of trial] will reflect one
thing—that we fought at every turn, at every opportunity, and we fought
to ensure that Brad received a fair trial. . . . When I’m in the courtroom,
I stand up and I look to my right and I see the United States govern-
ment, with all of its resources, all of its personnel. I see them standing
against me and Brad, and I have to admit to you that [that] can be
rather intimidating and I was intimidated, especially when the President
of the United States says, “Your client broke the law.” Especially, when
Congress members say, “Your client deserves the death penalty.”
Presentation by Bradley’s Attorney David Coombs, Transcript and Video, PVT. MANNING SUP-
PORT NETWORK, http://www.bradleymanning.org/activism/exclusive-presentation
(last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
201 Coombs further distanced himself from the full implications of the early strat-
egy in his interview with the TODAY Show: “The stress that he was under was mostly to
give context to what was going on at the time . . . It was never an excuse because that’s
not what drove his actions. What drove his actions was a strong moral compass.” See
TODAY: Bradley Manning: I Want to Live as a Woman, supra note 1.
202 This could also have been accomplished, however, by the publication of the
transcripts of the hearing.  Additionally, it should be noted that Coombs was the one
to break the news about Pfc. Manning’s preferred gender, name, and pronoun, and
he has stated he is committed to ensuring that she will have access to gender-af-
firming treatment (medical and otherwise) while she is incarcerated awaiting appeal.
See id. (“Coombs said he is ‘hoping’ that Fort Leavenworth ‘would do the right thing’
and provide hormone therapy for Manning. ‘If Fort Leavenworth does not, then I’m
going to do everything in my power to make sure they are forced to do so.’”).
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upon the assumption that Manning was not only on-board with this
strategy, but that she had an active voice in its creation and imple-
mentation. If a person accused does not want to be outed as trans
or gay, the defense attorney must respect that decision regardless of
the outcome on the case.
In addition to ensuring that the person accused approves of
the strategy, it is crucial that the potentially negative stereotypes in
defense narratives are helpful to the person’s case. This may be a
nearly impossible determination to make in advance. It is clear
from the foregoing that calling attention to a person’s sexual ori-
entation or gender identity in the toxic context of a criminal or
military courtroom can be extremely damaging. One commentator
cites a survey conducted by a Chicago newspaper that found that
potential jurors were “more than three times as likely to think they
could not be fair or impartial toward a gay or lesbian defendant as
toward a defendant from other minority groups, such as blacks,
Hispanics, or Asian-Americans.”203 Other commentators are ada-
mantly against the prosecution admitting evidence of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity in criminal trials, and specifically in capital
trials,204 although this evidence remains fair game for the defense
attorney.
As a person not yet practicing as a criminal defense attorney, I
am engaging in this debate from a somewhat academic stand-
point—however, I have experience working with the queer com-
munity and strategizing for transformative social justice, which led
me to law school. Grappling with the ethical issues inherent in the
work of criminal defense is a crucial process for those of us who
remain convinced, through the haze of legal indoctrination, that
radical lawyering is possible as a public defender, and that our old
notions of social justice don’t have to be discarded in this new
profession.
203 Mogul, supra note 192, at 479–80.
204 Shortnacy, supra note 186, at 356–57.

